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Adam Smith is generally viewed as a great optimist about commerce and commercialism.   
Consistent with this assessment is the conventional view that Smith believed in progress: he had 
an optimistic view of history. On the other hand, occasionally over the last thirty years 
commentators, such as Heilbroner, have suggested that Smith actually had a very pessimistic 
view of history and the prospects of commercial society. Can we explain Smith’s apparent 
inconsistencies?  One solution is that Smith “changed his mind” during his lifetime.  Another 
suggestion, proposed by Muller, is that Heilbroner (and others holding similar views) failed to 
understand Smith’s rhetoric. Muller is correct in suggesting that there is exaggeration in some of 
Smith’s pessimistic statements. Nevertheless, Smith’s vision has a darker tincture than Muller 
acknowledges: much of Smith’s pessimism about commercial society remains a reality which 
cannot be neatly explained away as “rhetoric.” 
 
 
1 Earlier versions of part of this article were presented at the 1994 American Political Science Association 
Conference, the 1996 History of Economics Conference, the 1996 Australasian Association for Philosophy (NZ 
Division) Conference and the 1996 Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference. This article 
draws largely from Alvey 2003(a) and the author wishes to thank Ashgate Publishing for allowing this usage.  
The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science under 




“Adam Smith is conventionally thought to have provided an account of …progress” and to be 
“the prophet of what we now call capitalism” (Tribe 1999, p.619). Most commentators have 
viewed Smith as optimistic about the likelihood of commercial society
2 coming into being, its 
goodness and its permanence (see Alvey 2003(a), pp.31-173; Alvey 2003(b)). This view 
prevails, even though thirty years ago Heilbroner presented the “dark side” of Smith’s view of 
the nature and future of commercial society (Heilbroner 1973, p.243). Heilbroner’s view, “which 
has been picked up by other scholars,” according to Muller “can only be sustained by ignoring 
the rhetorical function of Smith’s gloomier predictions” (Muller 1995, pp.246-7). In what 
follows we show that while some of Smith’s pessimistic predictions may be rhetorical, others 
indicate the dark reality that Smith discerned in, and predicted about, commercial society. 
Smith’s alleged optimistic view of history needs to be reconsidered.   
 
This article has seven sections. The first section presents a sketch of Smith’s view of human 
nature and his predominant, optimistic view of commerce and history. The next two sections 
discuss the problem of Smith’s occasional, pessimistic views about the goodness of commercial 
society as it matures and his concerns about the permanence of that society. The fourth section 
reviews the intellectual context of these pessimistic views. The next two sections discuss two 
possible explanations for Smith’s apparent inconsistency: a change of view during his lifetime 
and rhetoric. The final section draws some conclusions.   
 
 
1. HUMAN NATURE AND THE OPTIMISTIC VIEW OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY 
 
This section addresses two topics. First, we discuss Smith’s teleological view of human nature. 
Smith identifies several ends of human nature. What are these ends? How are they achieved? 
Second, in the light of his view of nature, we turn to Smith’s view of history. Are the instincts 
active in the path of human history? Does a parallel to the teleology immanent in human nature 
exist in human history? Let us begin with Smith’s view of human nature.
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Smith explicitly refers to self-preservation, procreation of the species, order, happiness and 
perfection of the species as natural human ends (Smith 1976(a), pp.77,166,168). In addition, 
given his stress on the concept, it seems reasonable to add freedom as an implicit, sixth end. As 
a sort of summary, Smith says that the “ultimate objects of all of our desires” are “ease and 
tranquillity” (Smith 1976(a), p.297). Some of the ends (such as preservation and order) also 
serve as prerequisites for other, higher ends. Consider in this light wealth, which is not only 
required for procreation and preservation but also for happiness (Smith 1976(a), p.205; Smith 
1976(b), p.96). Nature aims at comfortable, not bare, self-preservation; comfortable preservation 
serves therefore as a prerequisite for happiness (see Smith 1980, pp.112-3). 
 
The primary means to the various ends, Smith argues, are instincts, implanted by a providential 
“Author of nature” (Smith 1976(a), p.77). The “Author,” or God, could have left the discovery 
of the means to human reasoning but did not do so (see Smith 1976(a), pp.77-8). Whilst not 
impotent, human reasoning is weak in Smith’s view; indeed, it may subvert the “system of 
2 In Smith’s own time many European states, including England, France, Flanders, Holland and Genoa, had reached 
the commercial epoch (Smith 1976(b), pp.209,263,431). 
3 The next four paragraphs draw from Alvey 2003(b).  
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natural liberty,” the Smithian ideal of smallish government (Smith 1976(b), p.687). Fortunately, 
the teleology immanent in human nature is strong.   
 
Sometimes nature arranges the passions so that the private and the public good are harmonized. 
Consider Smith’s view on economic growth. The effect of growth is that wealth “trickles down” 
to the lowest ranks of society; a “liberal reward of labour” allows more children to survive and 
better fulfil the end of procreation (meaning increase) of the species, as well as other ends 
(Smith 1976(b), pp.22,72,87-8,99-100). Two of the factors that Smith says cause economic 
growth are the division of labour and the accumulation of capital.  Specialization materially 
benefits the individual and the society; further, it originates not from “human wisdom,” but from 
certain instinctive tendencies, notably the desire to persuade (Smith 1976(b), pp.13-36; Smith 
1978, pp.352,493-4; Kleer 2000, pp.17-18).   
 
In addition to this harmonious view, however, nature sometimes “deceives” us into achieving 
the public good. We often value means more than the end itself. Hence, we pursue wealth (and 
thus accumulate capital) not because of the real conveniences that we achieve (these are actually 
quite small) but because of our fascination with finely-crafted luxuries (Smith 1976(a), pp.50-
1,179-83; Kleer 2000, pp.18-19). By valuing means over ends we are tricked into working hard 
for the public good. Smith gives many other examples showing these two types of arrangements 
of the human passions.  
 
Now let us turn to Smith’s view of human history. Smith identifies four historical epochs: 
hunting, shepherding, farming and commerce (Smith 1976(b), pp.689-94; Smith 1978, 
pp.14,406-7,459). These stages represent different levels of economic development; economic 
growth and its causes are of great significance therefore. In Smith’s theory each new epoch is 
“more advanced” than, and “naturally succeeds,” its predecessor (Smith 1976(b), 
pp.690,692,694; Smith 1978, p.459; see also Smith 1978, p.235). The lower, and even the 
higher, ends are apparently increasingly satisfied as societies advance through these stages. Only 
the commercial societies are called “civilized” (Smith 1976(b), pp.708-12; Cropsey 2001, 
pp.66,73). For Winch, Smith assumes that stadial progress is “unilinear” (Winch 1978, p.63). 
This is one aspect of Smith’s putative optimistic view of human history. 
 
Another aspect of this optimism apparently arises when Smith discusses the “general 
circumstances of the society” which partly determine the average income levels (Smith 1976(b), 
p.72). There are three such “circumstances”: economic growth, stationarity and decline:   
 
[in the] progressive state … the great body of the people, seems to be happiest and most 
comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable in the declining. The progressive 
state is in reality the cheerful and hearty state to all the different orders of the society. 
The stationary is dull; the declining, melancholy. (Smith 1976(b), p.99) 
 
Smith’s eulogy of economic growth fits with his praise of commercial society, the epoch most 
closely associated with growth. Hence, another factor in Smith’s optimistic view of history is 
apparently identified. We now turn to Smith’s pessimistic views that were first presented by 
Marx but expounded more recently by Heilbroner. Smith indicates several problems associated  
3 
with commercial society, two of which are discussed here.
4  First, there are unsatisfactory 
elements of the society which emerge as it matures over time. Second, commercial societies are 
ephemeral. In section 2 the first point is discussed; and in section 3 the second point is discussed. 
 
 
2. THE PROBLEM OF THE GOODNESS OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY OVER TIME 
 
This section follows the outline provided by Heilbroner. He refers to the “material decline 
awaiting at the end of the economic journey, [and] moral decay suffered by society in the 
course of its journeying” (Heilbroner 1973, p.243; see also throughout). These we discuss in 
reverse order, beginning with what Heilbroner calls the “psychological and sociological 
implications” of decline (Heilbroner 1973, p.250).   
 
The division of labour is a fundamental cause of economic growth but it also features in the 
“dark side” of Smith perceived by critics of capitalism like Marx and Heilbroner (see Marx 
1954, p.342; Heilbroner 1973). Those confined to performing monotonous actions throughout 
their working lives suffer negative consequences. A huge literature has developed around 
Smith’s anticipation of Marx’s alienation theory (see references cited in Heilbroner 1973, p.243 
n.1; Alvey 2003(a), p.212 n.73). Smith says that eventually the bulk of the population is 
employed in monotonous occupations; the typical person under these conditions: 
 
becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.  The 
torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any 
rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment. 
(Smith 1976(b), p.782 quoted in Heilbroner 1973, p.252)  
 
The same cause “corrupts the courage of his mind” and it “corrupts even the activity of his 
body”; in short, “His dexterity at his own particular trade seems … to be acquired at the expense 
of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues” (Smith 1976(b), p.782). Smith adds that: “It is 
otherwise in the barbarous [pre-commercial] societies” (Smith 1976(b), p.782 quoted in 
Heilbroner 1973, p.253). The negative comparison with earlier stages of history means that 
Smith’s “final judgment … on the quality of life in commercial society is devastating” 
(Heilbroner 1973, p.253). In a less alarmed tone, the negative moral consequences of 
commercial society have been called by Winch examples of Smith’s “historical pessimism” 
(Winch 1978, p.117). 
 
Now let us turn to the termination of the growth process in a permanent stationary state. Smith’s 
hints at the emergence of stasis, have been frequently discussed in the history of economic 
thought literature.
5 In the permanent stasis: “both the wages of labour and the profits of stock 
would probably be very low.... [Wages would be] barely sufficient to keep up the number of 
labourers, and... [the population] could never be augmented” (Smith 1976(b), p.111). The 
primary cause of permanent stationarity in Smith’s analysis was land scarcity, but also assumed 
were diminishing returns in agriculture, a limited role for technological improvement and a 
“Malthusian” sexual instinct (see Smith 1976(b), p.109; Hollander 1987, pp.162-5). 
4 Two other problems could be mentioned. First, commercial society may not arise inevitably. Second, by relying 
upon a base motivation, the essential character of all commercial societies is flawed. See Alvey 1998, pp.1428-
31,1434-7; Alvey 2003(a), pp.177-220. 
5 See Hollander 1973, pp.171,184-6,250-1,292; Heilbroner 1973, pp.254-62; Hollander 1987, pp.66,84, 162-5,176.  
4 
The implications of the decline into stasis have been discussed frequently but a few points can 
be reiterated here. Once the profit rate reaches the very low equilibrium level, virtually everyone 
– even those who were previously rich – would be forced to work (Smith 1976(b), p.113). As we 
saw earlier, the stationary state is “hard” and “dull” for the “labouring poor”; the “scanty 
subsistence”
6 of the lower classes causes such a high infant mortality rate as to just maintain the 
equilibrium population (Smith 1976(b), pp.99,90; see also pp.91,97). At this low standard of 
living, the society will not be able to meet the ends of happiness, self-preservation and 
procreation of the species.
7 One wonders if this pessimistic prospect is any better than pre-
commercial “barbarism.”
8   
 
Muller, responding directly to Wrigley and indirectly to Heilbroner, suggests that “reading the 
most pessimistic scenarios of Ricardo and Malthus back into Smith” is inappropriate: for Smith, 
stasis “is a spectre to be avoided by wise policy,” not “an inevitable destination for commercial 
society” (Muller 1995, p.221 n.36; see Wrigley 1988, pp.47-9). Wrigley’s view of stasis, 
however, is actually closer to the truth than Muller’s.
9 Smith’s pre-industrial vision stresses 
agriculture and diminishing returns ensure a stationary state. Malthus differs from Smith only on 
the timing: the former saw the problem “in the immediate future” whereas, according to 
Heilbroner, the latter saw it in the “distant future” (Heilbroner 1973, p.256). In this instance, 
however, Heilbroner is not pessimistic enough: according to Smith’s first edition (1776) of The 
Wealth of Nations ( WN hereafter), Holland had almost reached this stage (Smith 1976(b), 
p.113). 
 
Sociological and economic problems do lie ahead for commercial societies as they mature. 
 
Even if no country had yet reached the permanent stationary state, this should not obscure 
Smith’s claim that two hundred years is “as long as the course of human prosperity usually 
endures” (Smith 1976(b), p.425; see also pp.365-7; cf. Brewer 1995, p.633).  
 
 
3. THE PROBLEM OF THE FUTURE COLLAPSE OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY 
 
This section discusses Smith’s view of the death that awaits all societies. While Heilbroner 
alludes to the “‘rise and fall’ of civilizations,” the highlighting of the “dark” themes discussed 
below was left to later commentators (Heilbroner 1973, p.256; cf. Winch 1978, pp.63,182; 
Haakonssen 1981, p.179). A number of scenarios are suggested by Smith for the collapse of 
commercial societies, two of which are presented here: external or internal subjugation; and the 
consequences of the accumulation of debt.
10 
 
Let us begin with the military theme, which is stressed by Smith. The fate of the ancient 
commercial societies was largely determined by military vulnerability. There are actually three 
types of these societies: defensive republics, conquering republics and monarchies. The model 
that Smith develops for the decline of the first of these provides the basis for understanding all 
6  On the “scanty subsistence” see Heilbroner 1973, p.247; Brewer 1999, p.239. 
7 The high-wage stationary state of J.S. Mill, and more recent environmentalists, is not envisioned by Smith (see 
Mill 1987, pp.746-51). 
8 Consider also Smith’s famous Lockean view (Smith 1976(b), p.24). 
9 Wrigley incorrectly asserts that real wages are fixed in the growth phase but his pessimistic view of stasis is 
essentially correct.  See Wrigley 1988, pp.47-8. 
10 On another scenario, the probable failure of statesmen, see Alvey 1998, p.1433; Alvey 2003(a), pp.226-7.  
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three. In his discussion of the defensive republics, he refers to the age of the state and the effects 
of the improvements of the arts, sciences, manufactures and commerce (these last four factors 
we can summarize as “commerce”) as the causes for decay and military subjugation: “Thus it 
must happen that the improvement of arts and commerce must make a great declension in the 
force and power of the republic in all cases” (Smith 1978, p.231 emphasis added). The courage 
of the population diminishes with the “progress in arts and sciences” (Smith 1978, p.231). The 
people no longer wish to bear arms; the government supports their view as it would feel the loss 
of taxation revenue if the people interrupted their regular employment (Smith 1978, pp.238,411-
2). Defensive republics are militarily vulnerable and are eventually defeated and subjugated. The 
commercial form is replaced by something else.   
 
“Commerce,” as indicated above, has the same negative effect on the conquering republics. This 
type of republic becomes opulent, producing “the same diminution of strength as in a defensive 
republic” (Smith 1978, p.235). While the reliance on mercenaries and the ambition of leading 
generals are the proximate factors that destroy them, Smith’s view of the underlying cause we 
saw previously. The “very tenuous tenure” of these republics soon expires (Smith 1978, p.233). 
Either they are overwhelmed by the mercenaries they hire from the neighbouring countries (and 
dragged to an earlier historical epoch) or one of the generals turns the society into a military 
monarchy.  
 
These monarchies, as demonstrated by the Roman Empire, can endure for a long time. 
Nevertheless, they also carry the same fatal disease: “But this government, as all others, seems 
to have a certain and fixed end which concludes it. For the improvements of the arts necessarily 
takes place here” rendering “the people unwilling to go to war” (Smith 1978, p.238 emphasis 
added; see also p.414). So, Smith showed that all three classical commercial forms of society 
inevitably collapsed. 
 
The second scenario for the collapse of commercial governments is the tendency of governments 
(at least modern governments) to accumulate debts. Servicing a growing foreign currency debt is 
clearly a problem, but Smith adds that even if all of the debt was owed to domestic investors, a 
large and growing debt is “pernicious” (Smith 1976(b), p.927). It will lead initially to increased 
taxation (causing the flight of domestic capital) and ultimately to the devaluation of the currency 
(thus punishing the industrious and frugal of those remaining) (Smith 1976(b), pp.927-9). This 
will severely retard the “natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity” (Smith 
1976(b), p.674). Smith concludes that the burden of debt “will in the long-run probably ruin, all 
the great nations of Europe” (Smith 1976(b), p.911 emphasis added; see also pp.497,928-9; cf. 
pp.342-3). Despite recommending policies to reduce the debt, Smith is not optimistic about their 
potential success (Winch 1978, p.136). Once again, doom is on the horizon. 
 
In this section we saw that, regardless of which explanation is adopted, Smith says that 
commercial societies inevitably collapse. He apparently accepts a cyclical theory of history.   





4. INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT OF THE PESSIMISTIC VIEW 
 
This section considers the intellectual context in which Smith wrote. First, we survey some of 
the contributions to the cyclical view of history. Second, we discuss the eighteenth-century view 
of economic growth. Third, we turn to the “civic humanist” tradition of thought, which has 
received a lot of attention in recent scholarship on the eighteenth century. 
 
The cyclical view of history is an ancient one, being held by authors such as Plato, Polybius and 
the Stoics.
11 It was also maintained by many modern writers such as Machiavelli, Hutcheson and 
Ferguson (Machiavelli 1996, pp.10-4; Hutcheson 1969, Vol. II pp.377-80; Ferguson 1966, 
pp.204-35). Often these writers had in view a cycle of regimes (see Mansfield 1996, pp.273,344 
n.34; Pocock 1975, p.77). In addition, there could also be a rise and fall of civilization itself. 
Smith was aware of the various cyclical views but his great fear was the decline of civilization. 
 
Next, we turn to the eighteenth-century view of economic growth. Francois Quesnay, James 
Steuart and David Hume all argued that economic decline would emerge at some stage (Brewer 
1995 throughout). Brewer suggests that in the pre-Smithian era only Turgot held that continuing 
growth was the “normal state of affairs” (Brewer 1995, p.609).   
 
Now we turn to the civic humanist perspective. Civic humanism was the name given by Pocock 
to a tradition of thought that he traced from Florence (Machiavelli and others) to Britain (James 
Harrington, Adam Ferguson and Andrew Fletcher) (see Pocock 1975, pp.386,426-32,450,499 
and throughout). The civic approach was based on the classical notion of virtuous citizenry. The 
citizen was supposed to be a landowner who was rich enough to be able to act independently in 
private life, fully participate in political life, and be willing and able to defend the state in 
warfare (Pocock 1975, pp.431,450). The eighteenth-century British form of civic humanism was 
expressed in opposition to the Whig oligarchy (which was in power for most of the century after 
the revolution of 1688) and especially to its perceived “corruption”: its reliance on a standing 
army, patronage, public credit and commerce.
12   
 
Each of the three themes discussed above appear in the writing of Adam Ferguson.
13 To some 
degree, these themes also appear in Smith. Unlike Ferguson, Smith is not generally viewed as a 
strong supporter of civic humanism, but rather as someone who was responding to this view. 
Generally he opposed it, but certain civic residues have also been discerned in his work (his 
concerns about the effects of debt on future prosperity and the effects of specialization on the 
mental and moral status of the general population). Now let us turn in the next two sections to 
two possible explanations for the pessimistic passages in Smith’s thought, beginning with the 
possibility that he changed his mind. 
 
 
11 Plato 1974, pp.359-98; Polybius 1922-7, Vol. III pp.283-9; Cicero 1933, pp.234-7. All of these authors are 
discussed by Smith in his works.  He specifically discusses the Stoic cyclical views (see Smith 1980, p.117). 
12 Many eighteenth-century pamphlets attacked the public debt (Kleer 1996, pp.325-6,330). Although many had a 
civic humanist tone, David Hume, who did not adopt the civic view, also opposed the debt (Hume 1987, pp.349-
65). 
13 On the cyclical view see Ferguson 1966, pp.208-9,279; on economic stagnation see Ferguson 1966, p.233 and 
Brewer 1999, p.247; and on civic themes see Ferguson 1966, pp.227,234,238,251.  
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5. A CHANGE OF VIEW 
 
Some commentators have mentioned Smith’s possible change of view as an explanation for 
some of his apparent inconsistencies. This possibility will be explored below.   
 
Smith identified three types of commercial societies: the classical commercial societies (the 
Greek republics and the Roman Republic and Empire); the modern mercantile societies (which 
are interventionist in economic affairs and imperialistic militarily); and the projected free trade 
commercial type. The collapse of all societies of the classical variety was a major concern for 
him. It is significant therefore, that, in the WN, Smith drastically revised his account in the 
Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJ hereafter) of the collapse of the classical commercial societies 
(Fitzgibbons 1995, pp.5,121-3).   
 
First, in the WN he apparently becomes less pessimistic (and hence more optimistic) about the 
harm done by “commerce” to the classical societies. Smith suggested in the WN that the major 
factor in the fall of the classical republics was not “commerce” but the lack of a standing army. 
(Smith 1976(b), pp.698-702). The reasons given for the demise of the Roman Republic was 
revised to the ill-advised admission of many Italians to Roman citizenship (Smith 1976(b), 
pp.622-4). Special factors (notably the degeneration of the army into a mere militia) were 
blamed for the Fall of the Roman Empire (Smith 1976(b), pp.703-5). In the LJ, Smith appears 
like a civic humanist, blaming “commerce” for the demise of the classical societies; in the WN, 
he mitigates his concerns about “commerce” by suggesting that remedies (modern weaponry and 
a standing army; see Smith 1976(b), pp.701-8) are available.   
 
Second, he apparently becomes more optimistic about the permanence of commercial societies. 
Decline is inevitable in the LJ but in the WN he is less emphatic, merely stating that “empires, 
like all the other works of men, have hitherto proved mortal” (Smith 1976(b), p.830). The 
introduction of standing armies and modern weaponry may become the norm. His concern with 
military vulnerability seemed to change over time away from the civic view. McNamara  says 
that Smith may have changed his mind on the cyclical theory (McNamara 1998, p.51).   
 
Third, concerning the sociological problems mentioned above, Smith seems to have revised his 
thinking. His view that in commercial societies “[t]he minds of men are contracted and rendered 
incapable of elevation” (Smith 1978, p.541 emphasis added) is softened in the WN.  There is a 
suggestion in the WN, stressed by Muller, that the negative effects of the division of labour only 
follow if the government does not prevent it by public expenditures, principally on education 
(Smith 1976(b), p.782; see also pp.782-8; Muller 1995, pp.149-50).   
 
There does seem to be an increase in Smith’s optimism between his LJ and his WN and a 
corresponding reduction in his civic concerns. Nevertheless, Smith remained committed 
throughout his lifetime to two of the causes of decline: the accumulation of debt and land 





We turn now to Muller’s explanation for some of Smith’s pessimism: rhetoric. First, we discuss 
the lecture notes from Smith’s lectures on rhetoric. Next, we turn to how Muller used Smith’s  
8 
“rhetoric” in his interpretation of Smith. Then we will suggest ways in which “rhetoric” can be 
used to reach different conclusions from Muller’s.   
 
In his lectures on rhetoric Smith says that there are several styles of writing: historical, poetical, 
didactic (or scientific) and oratorical (or rhetorical) (Smith 1983, pp.35,62,104). The last three 
styles need some explanation. Historical discourse aims “barely to relate some fact,” whereas 
didactic and rhetorical discourses aim “to prove some proposition” (Smith 1983, pp.35,62). 
Didactic writing:  
 
put[s] before us the arguments on both sides of the question in their true light, giving to 
each its proper degree of influence, and has it in view to persuade no farther than the 
arguments themselves appear convincing. The rhetorical [method] … endeavours by all 
means to persuade us; … it magnifies all the arguments on the one side and diminishes 
or conceals those that might be brought on the [other] side. (Smith 1983, p.62) 
 
Didactic writing aims primarily at instruction, with persuasion secondary; rhetorical writing 
reverses the priorities (Smith 1983, p.62).  
 
What style(s) did Smith use in the books published by him during his lifetime? The outward 
form suggests that they are scientific treatises: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS hereafter) 
on morality and the WN on political economy. Poetry is absent from these works but he uses the 




Next, let us see how Muller used Smith’s rhetoric in his interpretation. Muller says that Smith’s 
powerful presentation of the negative consequences of commercial society on the virtue of the 
citizenry, seen earlier, is one of many examples of his rhetoric.
15 The worst-case scenario is 
allegedly described in “harrowing” terms by Smith in order to prevent such an outcome (Muller 
1995, p.149). Smith presents “a list of expensive recommendations for new public expenditure,” 
especially education, designed to solve the problem: “Having alarmed his readers, he suggests 
the means of dispelling their anxiety” (Muller 1995, p.150). Muller’s specific claim is 
interesting, but he does not suggest that it can be generalized for all of Smith’s pessimistic 
statements. Rather, rhetoric should be used to explain away examples of Smith’s extreme 
optimism as well. 
 
In developing his rhetorical analysis, Muller speaks of the libertarian interpretation of Smith that 
became popular based on Smith’s “system of natural liberty” (Muller 1995, p.187). After 
quoting a colourful passage from Smith on this theme, he says that Smith’s “rhetoric of ‘natural 
liberty’ was so compelling that it led many readers” to adopt the view of “explicit 
providentialism, the belief that the deep structure of the world was fundamentally beneficient” 
(Muller 1995, p.187 quoting Smith 1976(b), p.687). Muller goes on to suggest that Smith did not 
anticipate the consequences of his own rhetoric (Muller 1995, p.188). Hence, Smith’s rhetoric 
was providential but his true view was not. In short, Muller’s interpretation is that extremely 
pessimistic and extremely optimistic statements in Smith’s writings can be traced to his rhetoric; 
14 See Winch 1978, p.171; Haakonssen 1981, p.77; Kleer 1995, pp.275-9; Fitzgibbbons 1995, p.126; and the 
sources mentioned in Alvey 2003(a), p.250. 
15 Muller 1995, pp.149-50 citing Smith 1976(b), p.782. Muller might also have applied his approach to debt, the 
topic of the final chapter of the WN (an apt location for a rhetorical flourish).  
9 
trimmed of its rhetorical providentialism and teleology, Smith’s true view emerges as a 
moderate, yet largely optimistic one. This has some plausibility; nevertheless, Smith’s teleology 
plays a larger role than mere rhetoric.
16  
 
Next, let us use Muller’s methodology but now apply it in a different way. Recall that rhetorical 
writing “diminishes or conceals” arguments which oppose your case (Smith 1983, p.62). 
Consider now Smith’s increasing optimism over time suggested in the previous section. Even if 
priority is normally given to works authorized by a writer, perhaps this rule should be revised in 
this case; the revisions may represent a deliberate concealment of the problems with commercial 
society rather than a “change of view.” Why might Smith have done so?   
 
In a private letter he refers to “the very violent [rhetorical] attack” that he made “upon the whole 
commercial [interventionist, mercantile] system of Great Britain” in the WN (Smith 1987, 
p.251). Smith wanted to change public policy towards the free trade model and, in order to do 
so, he needed to motivate potential statesmen to undertake fundamental policy changes. Often 
these people cannot be persuaded by direct appeals to the beneficial effects of certain policies on 
public wellbeing. In his TMS, Smith offers an indirect means of persuasion: to present “a certain 
beautiful and orderly system” and to show “how this system might be introduced into his [the 
reader’s] own country” (Smith 1976(a), pp.185-6). This may lead to such a fascination with the 
system that the politician strives to “perfect and improve” the system in his own country (Smith 
1976(a), p.185). This is another case where we come to value means over the end. The “love of 
system” can lead to fanaticism and bloody consequences but Smith thought that attachment to 
his system obviated such dangers (Smith 1976(a), pp.233-4; McNamara 1998, pp.32-5,91). Even 
though his “system of natural liberty” is prominent (and beneficial overall), he retained his 
pessimistic remarks for some careful readers. For the philosophic few, the dark side would be 
acknowledged quietly (but sometimes boldly). As for the others, it was best not to highlight 
these problems lest potential statesmen become disenchanted with the beautiful system that 
Smith had constructed. In other words, Smith’s rhetoric of providentialism (see section 1) was 
deliberate and the libertarian interpretation (or something close to it) was the one that he wanted 
to be generally adopted from the WN; this interpretation would be the basis for a new public 
policy of free trade.
17   Thus using the “rhetorical method” can reinforce a pessimistic 
interpretation of Smith’s true view.   
 
Using the same strategy, let us revisit the alienation caused by the division of labour. The fact 
that alienation deserves “serious attention of government” does not mean that anything can be 
achieved (Smith 1976(b), p.787). Marx notes that the homeopathic doses of education 
recommended by Smith are unlikely to provide a full remedy (Marx 1954, p.342). This unhappy 
state of affairs, consistent with the view of the LJ, may also have been hidden from view.  
Nevertheless, this seems to be an extremely conspiratorial explanation.
18  
 
A more balanced assessment emerges when we return to Smith’s purpose in the WN. He wanted 
to attach potential statesmen in his audience to his “system of natural liberty,” which comes 
closest to actualization in the free trade variety of commercial society. This means that this 
16 See Kleer 1995 and Kleer 2000. The coexistence of Smith’s teleology with his pessimistic historical views raises 
theological problems which cannot be addressed here. 
17 While Smith may have advocated some new governmental expenditures, the overall effect was a considerable 
reduction in the scope of governmental activity. 
18 By rejecting this possibility, the view expressed in Alvey 2003(a), p.253 is revised.  
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system is better than the alternatives. Hence, Smith’s occasional suggestions that commercial 
society may be inferior to earlier stages in history are troubling. Perhaps these comparisons refer 
to the classical or mercantile versions of commercialism or, more probably, they are real cases of 
Smith’s pessimistic exaggeration. 
 
Let us now return to Muller’s moderately optimistic vision attributed to Smith. Despite the 
merits of this interpretation, it misses the reality of the threats posed by debt and land scarcity.  It 
remains too optimistic. 
 
Finally, let us conclude this section. Smith clearly uses rhetoric in his work and this may explain 
some of his pessimism. Yet it is clearly not a solution to all of Smith’s pessimistic passages. 
Further, the rhetorical method can plausibly be turned against the more optimistic view of 





Smith’s optimistic reputation, concerning commerce, commercial society and its future, needs 
revision. There is a “dark side” as well. Certain extreme statements that Smith made, suggesting 
that commercial society is worse than societies at earlier stages in history, and stressed by 
Heilbroner, may indeed have been rhetorical exaggeration. Nevertheless, the dark aspects of 
commercial society that emerge from time to time in Smith’s writings show the reality that he 
sought to keep partly, but not fully, concealed. Contrary to Muller, Smith’s true assessment of 
commercial society was not particularly optimistic. We can perhaps draw a parallel to 
Churchill’s assessment that democracy is the worst type of government except every other type 
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